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Neuroaesthetics: A Coming of Age Story
Anjan Chatterjee

Abstract
■ Neuroaesthetics is gaining momentum. At this early junc-

ture, it is worth taking stock of where the field is and what lies
ahead. Here, I review writings that fall under the rubric of neuroaesthetics. These writings include discussions of the parallel organizational principles of the brain and the intent and practices of
artists, the description of informative anecdotes, and the emer-

INTRODUCTION
What does neuroscience have to offer aesthetics? Neuroaesthetics, as a field, is gathering force (Skov & Vartanian,
2009). As it grows, the field faces the challenge of being
both true to its scientific roots and relevant to aesthetics.
The term aesthetics is used broadly to encompass the perception, production, and response to art, as well as interactions with objects and scenes that evoke an intense
feeling, often of pleasure. I focus on visual aesthetics,
although the principles also apply to music, dance, and literature. The term neuroaesthetics is also used broadly as a
domain that has something to do with properties of the
brain as it engages in aesthetics. I describe the kinds of
writings that fall under the rubric of neuroaesthetics and
examine what, in my view, is needed for the field to mature
as a science, particularly as an experimental science. I then
point to some questions worth pursuing in the near future
and conclude with challenges for the field.

NEUROAESTHETIC WRITINGS
Parallelism
Writings on aesthetics by prominent neuroscientists highlight parallels between properties of art and organizational
principles of the brain. Zeki (1999a, 1999b) should be
credited for introducing neuroaesthetics into scientific discourse. He exemplifies the parallelism approach and argues forcefully that no theory of aesthetics is complete
without an understanding of its neural underpinnings.
He suggested that the goals of the nervous system and
of artists are similar. Both are driven to understand essential visual attributes of the world. The nervous system decomposes visual information into such attributes as color,
luminance, and motion. Similarly, many artists, particularly
University of Pennsylvania
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gence of experimental neuroaesthetics. I then suggest a few areas
within neuroaesthetics that might be pursued profitably. Finally, I
raise some challenges for the field. These challenges are not
unique to neuroaesthetics. As neuroaesthetics comes of age, it
might take advantage of the lessons learned from more mature
domains of inquiry within cognitive neuroscience. ■

within the last century, isolate and enhance different visual
attributes. For example, Matisse emphasized color and
Calder emphasized motion. Zeki suggests that artists endeavor to uncover important distinctions in the visual
world and discover visual modules that are segregated
functionally and anatomically within the brain.
Parallelism claims point to the fact that artists are experts of visual representations and part of their magic lies
in their creative expression of this expertise. For example,
Cavanagh (2005) also shows that images in paintings often
violate the physics of shadows, reflections, colors, and contours. Rather than follow physical properties of the world,
these painters reflect perceptual shortcuts used by our
minds. Artists, in experimenting with forms of depiction,
discovered what psychologists and neuroscientists are
now identifying as principles of perception. Livingstone
(2002) and Conway and Livingstone (2007) reveal how artists make use of complex interactions between different
components of vision in creating visual effects in their
paintings. Livingstone suggests that the shimmering quality of water or the sunʼs glow on the horizon seen in some
impressionist paintings (e.g., the sun and surrounding
clouds in Monetʼs “Impression Sunrise”) is produced by
isoluminant objects distinguishable only by color. This
strategy plays on the distinction between the dorsal (where)
and ventral (what) processing distinction (Ungerleider &
Mishkin, 1982). The dorsal stream is sensitive to differences in luminance, motion, and spatial location, whereas
the ventral stream is sensitive to simple form and color.
Isoluminant forms are processed by the ventral stream
but are not fixed with respect to motion or spatial location,
as the dorsal stream does not process this information.
Thus, isoluminant forms are experienced as unstable or
shimmering. Conversely, because shape can be derived from
luminance differences, she argues that artists can use contrast to produce shapes, and leave color for expressive, rather
than descriptive, purposes. Livingstone highlights the way
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that combinatorial properties of visual attributes contribute to our visual perception. Artists use these combinatorial properties to produce specific aesthetic effects.
Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) proposed a set of
perceptual principles that might underlie aesthetic experiences. They emphasize the “peak shift” phenomenon as offering insight into the aesthetics of abstract art by relying on
Tinbergenʼs (1954) work on this phenomenon. Tinbergen
observed that sea gull chicks beg for food from their
mothers by pecking on a red spot near the tip of the
motherʼs beak. However, the chicks respond even more
vigorously to a disembodied long thin stick with three red
stripes near the end. Ramachandran and Hirstein propose
that neural structures that evolved to respond to specific visual stimuli respond more vigorously (a shift in their peak
response) to underlying primitives of that form even when
the viewer is not aware of the primitive. Their hypothesis
is that artists producing abstracts make explicit use of
these visual primitives in evoking aesthetic responses in
viewers.
The parallelism approach to neuroaesthetics recognizes
that the production and perception of art ought to conform to principles of neural organization. Properties of artworks and strategies used by artists have parallels in how
the nervous system apprehends and organizes its visual
world. The question for brain–art parallelism is how to
translate this starting point into programmatic research
with experiments testing falsifiable hypotheses.
Informative Anecdotes
A good example of informative anecdotes is observations
of the effects of neurological disease on the production of
art (Zaidel, 2005). The effect of brain damage on the capacity to produce visual art stands in sharp contrast to its effects on many other human capacities. Diseases of the
brain can impair our ability to speak or comprehend language, to coordinate movements, to recognize objects, to
apprehend emotions, and to make logical decisions.
Although diseases of the brain can certainly impair the ability to produce art, in some instances, paradoxically, the art
seems to improve. Elsewhere, I proposed that such paradoxical improvements can be produced by a changing disposition to produce art, an enhanced visual vocabulary,
better descriptive accuracy, or enhanced expressivity
(Chatterjee, 2006, 2009). Here, I outline the changes in
disposition and enhanced expressivity produced by these
“experiments of nature.”
Acquired Disposition to Produce Art
Neurological disorders that produce obsessive–compulsive
traits can also dispose people to produce art. Such a change
in disposition to produce art is exemplified in a subset of
patients with fronto-temporal dementias (FTDs). FTDs
can cause profound changes in personality. People with
FTD can be disorganized, socially disinhibited, and have
54
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problems with their language, attention, and ability to make
decisions. Despite these alterations in comportment and
cognition, Miller and Hou (2004) and Miller et al. (1998)
discovered that some people with FTD develop a propensity to produce art. They note that the art tends to be realistic rather than abstract or symbolic. The art is most often
visual and is highly detailed. The artists with FTD themselves are intensely preoccupied with their art, suggesting
that obsessive–compulsive traits acquired through their
disease contributes to this artistic proclivity.
Other cases of acquired obsessive–compulsive personality traits have resulted in remarkable artistic output. Sacks
(1995b) described Franco Magnani, an Italian painter in San
Francisco. Magnani painted hundreds of realistic scenes of
Pontito, an Italian town where he grew up. After a febrile
illness, which was probably an encephalitis, he began to
paint obsessively. Pontito was the only subject of his art.
Sacks speculated that Magnani had partial complex seizures
and was, in part, demonstrating the obsessive personality
disorder sometimes associated with temporal lobe epilepsy (Waxman & Geschwind, 1975). However, instead of
being hypergraphic verbally, as is more common among
such people, he was hypergraphic visually. In a similar vein,
Lythgoe, Polak, Kalmus, de Haan, and Khean Chong (2005)
reported the case of a builder with a subarachnoid hemorrhage, who became an obsessive artist after he recovered
from the initial injury. He began to draw hundreds of
sketches, mostly faces. He then moved to large-scale drawings, sometimes covering entire room, and confined his art
to a few themes. The authors emphasize his perseverative
tendencies as critical to the emergence of his artistic skills.
We also reported obsessive painting practices in an artist with Parkinsonʼs disease following treatment with dopamine agonists (Chatterjee, Hamilton, & Amorapanth,
2006).
A subset of autistic children produces striking visual
images (Sacks, 1995a). The most detailed description of
such a case was Nadia, as reported by Selfe (1977). Despite
severe developmental abnormalities, Nadia had remarkable drawing skills. By the age of 3 she was drawing life-like
horses. She drew intensively for a few moments at a time,
always copying images. She also focused on specific kinds
of images like horses, of which she drew hundreds of examples. Although Nadiaʼs abilities were striking, she is not
unique. Autistic children with striking drawing skills seem
to focus on specific subjects and draw them repeatedly.
These artists produce realistic images and tend to be
preoccupied by specific themes. Although the neural basis
for obsessive–compulsive disorders is not completely understood, it is associated with a dysfunction of orbito-frontal
and medial-temporal cortices and fronto-striatal circuits
(Kwon et al., 2003; Ursu, Stenger, Shear, Jones, & Carter,
2003; Saxena et al., 1999). Notably, in the cases described,
these regions could have been damaged and posterior
occipito-temporal cortices were presumably intact. The
preservation of posterior cortices ensures that the neural
substrates for recognizing and representing faces, places,
Volume 23, Number 1

and objects are preserved and are thus available to be the
subject of these artistsʼ obsessions.
Enhanced Expressivity
Among the most intriguing effects of brain damage on artists is the class of phenomena in which the resulting art is
surprisingly appealing. Right hemisphere damage can produce left spatial neglect in which patients are unaware
of the left side of space (Chatterjee, 2003). Artists with neglect omit the left side of images that they draw or paint
(Blanke, Ortigue, & Landis, 2003; Cantagallo & Sala,
1998; Halligan & Marshall, 1997; Schnider, Regard, Benson,
& Landis, 1993; Marsh & Philwin, 1987; Jung, 1974). As they
recover from their neglect, their use of line may still be
impaired. Two examples show how changed spatial representations can produce highly regarded art. Lovis Corinth,
an important German artist, suffered a right hemisphere
stroke in 1911. As he recovered, he resumed painting.
His self portraits and portraits of his wife showed clear
changes in style, with details on the left sometimes left
out and textures on the left blended with the background.
Alfred Kuhn characterized his later work as shifting him
into the circle of great artists (quoted in Gardner, 1975).
Heller (1994) reported the experience of Loring Hughes,
who after a right hemisphere stroke abandoned her premorbid style of depictive accuracy. Instead, she turned
to her own imagination and emotions. The artistic community responded well to her new images. The critic Eileen
Watkins described her work as now delivering “an emotional wallop,” that was not present previously.
Changes produced by left hemisphere damage are exemplified in the Bulgarian painter, Zlatio Boiyadjiev, and
the Californian artist, Katherine Sherwood. Boiyadjievʼs
premorbid artistic style was natural and pictorial and he
tended to use earth tones in his paintings. Following the
onset of his aphasia, Boiyadjievʼs paintings have been considered richer, more colorful, and containing more fluid
and energetic lines (Brown, 1977; Zaimov, Kitov, & Kolev,
1969). The imagery in his work became more inventive
and, at times, even bizarre and fantastical. Katherine
Sherwood suffered a left hemisphere hemorrhagic stroke,
which also left her with an aphasia and right-sided weakness ( Waldman, 2000). Premorbidly, her images were described as “highly cerebral.” After her stroke, she felt that
she could not produce such images if she wanted. Her new
style has been described as “raw” and “intuitive,” with large
irregular circular movements. She says her left hand enjoys
an ease and a grace with the brush that her right hand
never had, and describes it as “unburdened.”
These cases are but a few examples of the neuropsychological effects of art (for comprehensive reviews, see
Chatterjee, 2004b, 2009; Zaidel, 2005). The next step is
to test the inferences made from these anecdotal observations. To do so, we recently developed a tool, the Assessment
of Art Attributes (AAA) (Chatterjee, Widick, Sternschein,
Smith, & Bromberger, 2010). The AAA can quantify

changes in specific attributes of the art of any person with
brain damage. Charting such changes systematically will allow us to identify the specificity of patterns of change that
happens to production of art following brain damage.

EXPERIMENTAL NEUROAESTHETICS
Frameworks
An experimental research program in visual neuroaesthetics rests on two principles (Chatterjee, 2002, 2004a).
First, visual aesthetics, like vision in general, has multiple
components. Second, aesthetic experiences emerge from
a combination of responses to these different components. The process by which humans visually recognize
objects offers a framework from which to consider these
components. Investigations can be focused on these components and on their properties in various combinations.
The nervous system processes visual information both
in hierarchical sequence and in parallel (Farah, 2000; Zeki,
1993; Van Essen, Feleman, DeYoe, Ollavaria, & Knierman,
1990). The sequential components of visual processing
can be classified as early, intermediate, and late vision
(Marr, 1982). Early vision extracts simple elements from
the visual environment, such as color, luminance, shape,
motion, and location (Livingstone & Hubel, 1987, 1988).
These simple elements are processed in different parts
of the brain. Intermediate vision segregates some elements
and groups others together to form coherent regions in what
would otherwise be a chaotic and overwhelming sensory
array (Ricci, Vaishnavi, & Chatterjee, 1999; Grossberg,
Mingolla, & Ros, 1997; Vecera & Behrmann, 1997; Biederman
& Cooper, 1991). Late vision selects which of these coherent
regions to scrutinize and evokes memories from which objects are recognized and meanings attached (Chatterjee,
2003; Farah, 2000).
The hierarchical sequence of visual processing must be
reflected in visual aesthetics (Chatterjee, 2004a; for related
models that also incorporate broader contextual and cultural factors, see Jacobsen, 2006; Leder, Belke, Oeberst,
& Augustin, 2004)). Any work of art can be decomposed
into its early, intermediate, and late vision components.
Aesthetic perception can distinguish between form and
content (e.g., Woods, 1991; Russell & George, 1990), a distinction demonstrated experimentally (Ishai, Fairhall, &
Pepperell, 2007). Similarly, scientists observe that form is
processed by early and intermediate vision, whereas content is processed by later vision. Thus, the early vision features of an art object might be its color and its spatial
location. These elements would be grouped together to
form larger units in intermediate vision. Grouping creates
“unity in diversity,” a central notion of compositional
balance.
Beyond perception, two other aspects of aesthetics
are important. The first is the emotional response to an
aesthetic image; the second is how aesthetic judgments
are made. The anterior medial temporal lobe, medial
Chatterjee
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and orbito-frontal cortices, and subcortical structures
mediate emotions in general, and reward systems in particular (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Breiter, Aharon,
Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 2001; OʼDoherty, Kringelbach,
Rolls, Hornack, & Andrews, 2001; Delgado, Nystrom, Fissell,
Noll, & Fiez, 2000; Elliott, Friston, & Dolan, 2000; Schultz,
Dayans, & Montague, 1997). Aesthetic judgments about
stimuli, as measured by preference ratings, are likely to engage widely distributed circuits, most importantly, dorsolateral frontal and medial frontal cortices. The general
point is that visual neuroaesthetics, like most complex biological systems, is hierarchical and can be decomposed
into stable component subsystems (Simon, 1962). This
hierarchical organization is precisely what makes experimental approaches to aesthetics possible.
I have emphasized a cognitive neuroscience framework
for experimental neuroaesthetics. Another overarching
framework to think about aesthetics comes from evolutionary theorists. They make three kinds of arguments.
First, beauty serves as a proxy for health and vigor in mate
selection. Second, beautiful objects are those that are complex and yet are processed efficiently. And third, art making and appreciation serves an important ritualistic
function that enhances social cohesion. Space limitations
do not allow an adequate consideration of evolutionary
perspectives on beauty and art (see Brown & Dissanayake,
2009; Cela-Conde et al., 2009; Dissanayake, 2008; Zaidel,
2005; Grammer, Fink, Moller, & Thornhill, 2003; PentonVoak et al., 2001; Etcoff, 1999; Rentschler, Jüttner, Unzicker,
& Landis, 1999; Thornhill & Gangestad, 1999; Zahavi &
Zahavi, 1997; Symons, 1979 for relevant discussions). Ultimately, evolutionary and cognitive neuroscience approaches
to aesthetics are likely to converge in informative ways.
Imaging Beauty
Beauty is central to most peopleʼs concept of aesthetics
( Jacobsen, Buchta, Kohler, & Schroger, 2004). Of course,
not all art is beautiful and artists do not always intend to
produce beautiful things. However, beauty remains a central concept in discussions of aesthetic experiences. Understanding the neural basis of the perception of and
response to beauty might give us insight into the perception of and response to visual art. Facial beauty has received most attention in cognitive neuroscience.
The response to facial beauty is likely to be deeply encoded in our biology. Cross-cultural judgments of facial
beauty are quite consistent (Etcoff, 1999; Perrett, May, &
Yoshikawa, 1994; Jones & Hill, 1993). Adults and children
within and across cultures agree in their judgments of facial attractiveness (Langlois et al., 2000), suggesting that
universal principles of facial beauty exist. Infants look longer
at attractive faces within a week of being born, and the effects of facial attractiveness on infantsʼ gaze generalize
across race, sex and age by 6 months (Slater et al., 1998;
Langlois, Ritter, Roggman, & Vaughn, 1991). Thus, the disposition to engage attractive faces is present in brains that
56
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have not been modified greatly by experience. Some components of beauty are undoubtedly shaped further by cultural factors (Cunningham, Barbee, & Philhower, 2002),
but the universal components are likely to have distinct
neural underpinnings.
Several studies report that attractive faces activate neural
circuitry involved in reward systems, including orbitofrontal cortex, the nucleus accumbens, the ventral striatum (Ishai, 2007; Kranz & Ishai, 2006; OʼDoherty et al.,
2003; Aharon et al., 2001; Kampe, Frith, Dolan, & Frith,
2001), and the amygdala ( Winston, OʼDoherty, Kilner,
Perrett, & Dolan, 2007). These regional activations are interpreted as reflecting emotional valences attached to attractive faces (Senior, 2003). The particular emotional
valences are those involved in the expectation of rewards
and the satisfaction of appetites. The idea that attractive
faces are rewarding stimuli, at least for men, is evident behaviorally. Heterosexual men discount higher future rewards for smaller immediate rewards with attractive
female faces ( Wilson & Daly, 2004). Presumably, these patterns of neural activation reflect ways in which attractive
faces influence mate selection (Ishai, 2007; Kranz & Ishai,
2006).
Perceptual features of faces, such as averageness, symmetry, the structure of cheekbones, the relative size of the
lower half of the face, and the width of the jaw, influence
peopleʼs judgments of facial beauty (Penton-Voak et al.,
2001; Enquist & Arak, 1994; Grammer & Thornhill, 1994).
Winston et al. (2007) found that left posterior occipitotemporal activity was enhanced by facial attractiveness.
We conducted a study to examine the extent to which
facial attractiveness is apprehended automatically. Participants judged the attractiveness or matched the identity of
pairs of faces. Attractiveness judgments evoked neural activity within a distributed network involving ventral visual
association cortices and parts of dorsal posterior parietal
and prefrontal cortices (Chatterjee, Thomas, Smith, &
Aguirre, 2009). We inferred that the parietal, medial, and
dorsolateral frontal activations represented neural correlates of the attention and decision-making components
of this task. We also found positively correlated activity
within the insula and negatively correlated activations
within anterior and posterior cingulate cortex. We inferred
that these patterns represent the emotional responses to
attractiveness. Importantly, when subjects matched the
identity of faces, attractiveness continued to evoke neural
responses in ventral visual areas. This neural response was
of a strength that was indistinguishable from the response
when participants considered beauty explicitly. We inferred that this ventral occipital region responds to beauty
automatically.
Facial attractiveness has pervasive social effects beyond
its specific role in mate selection (Palermo & Rhodes,
2007; Olson & Marshuetz, 2005). Attractive individuals
are considered intelligent, honest, pleasant, natural leaders (Ritts, Patterson, & Tubbs, 1992; Lerner, Lerner, Hess,
& Schwab, 1991; Kenealy, Frude, & Shaw, 1988), and are
Volume 23, Number 1

viewed as having socially desirable traits, such as strength
and sensitivity (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972). The cascade of neural events that bias social decisions is likely to
be triggered by an early perceptual response to attractiveness. We proposed that neural activity within ventral visual
cortices in automatic response to facial attractiveness
serves as the initial trigger for this cascade (Chatterjee
et al., 2009).
Imaging Art
A few studies have used art to examine the neural localization of aesthetic processes. Although the goals in these studies are similar, their experimental approaches differ and
the results, at first glance, appear quite varied. Kawabata
and Zeki (2004) asked participants to rate abstract, still life,
landscape, or portrait paintings as beautiful, neutral, or
ugly. Not surprisingly, they found that the pattern of activity within ventral visual cortex varied depending on
whether subjects were looking at portraits, landscapes,
or still lifes. In orbito-frontal (BA 11) cortex, they found
greater activity for beautiful than for ugly or neutral stimuli.
In anterior cingulate (BA 32) and left parietal cortex
(BA39), they found greater activity for beautiful than for
neutral stimuli. Only activity within orbito-frontal cortex increased with the beauty of all the painting types and the
authors interpreted this activity as representing the neural
underpinnings of the aesthetic emotional experience.
Vartanian and Goel (2004) used images of representational and abstract paintings in an fMRI study. They found
that activity within the occipital gyri bilaterally and the left
anterior cingulate increased with preference ratings. They
also found that activity within the right caudate decreased
as preference ratings decreased. Representational paintings evoked more activity within the occipital poles, the
precuneus, and the posterior middle temporal gyrus than
did abstract paintings.
Cela-Conde et al. (2004) used magnetoencephalography to record event potentials when participants viewed
images of artworks and photographs. Participants judged
whether or not the images were beautiful. Beautiful
images evoked greater neural activity than not beautiful
images over left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex with a latency of 400–1000 msec. The authors infer that this region
is involved in making aesthetic judgments.
Jacobsen, Schubotz, Hofel, and von Cramon (2005)
used a different strategy to investigate the neural correlates of beauty in an fMRI study. Rather than use actual artworks as their stimuli, they used a set of geometric shapes
designed in the laboratory. Participants judged whether
the images were beautiful or whether the images were
symmetric. Participants found symmetric patterns more
beautiful than nonsymmetric ones. Aesthetic judgments,
more than symmetry judgments, activated medial frontal
cortex (BA 9/10), the precuneus, and ventral prefrontal
cortex (BA 44/47). The left intraparietal sulcus was conjointly active for symmetry and beauty judgments. Both

beauty and complexity of the images evoked activity within
orbito-frontal cortex. In a follow-up study using the same
stimuli (Hofel & Jacobsen, 2007), they found that beauty
generated a lateral positive evoked potential in a temporal
window between 360 and 1225 msec.
One might be disheartened that these studies investigating aesthetics, report inconsistent patterns of activation. Nadal, Munar, Capo, Rosselo, and Cela-Conde (2008)
propose that these seemingly varied results of these studies
are compatible with the general model (Chatterjee, 2004a),
linking aesthetics to the neuroscience of visual and affective
processing as well as reward systems and decision-making.
Engaging visual properties of paintings increases activity within ventral visual cortices (Vartanian & Goel, 2004).
Aesthetic judgments activate parts of dorsolateral prefrontal
and medial prefrontal cortices ( Jacobsen et al., 2005; CelaConde et al., 2004). In addition, emotional responses to
these stimuli activate orbito-frontal ( Jacobsen et al., 2005;
Kawabata & Zeki, 2004) as well as anterior cingulate cortices
(de Tommaso, Sardaro, & Livrea, 2008; Kawabata & Zeki,
2004; Vartanian & Goel, 2004).

FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As neuroaesthetics moves forward, several domains could
be pursued profitably. Here, I suggest three: explorations
of the relationship of perception to aesthetic experiences,
the nature of aesthetic judgment, and characterizing the
aesthetic reward.
The Relationship of Perception to
Aesthetic Experiences
As described above, visual art can be decomposed into distinct attributes such as color, line, texture, and form. Promising questions for empirical research include a better
understanding of how these visual perceptual attributes
contribute to the aesthetic experience. Can we measure
the contributions of these attributes? Some properties of
visual displays can be described with exquisite mathematical precision (Graham & Field, 2007; Redies, 2007).
These quantifiable parameters might also be used in neuroscience experiments.
How much of the aesthetic experience resides in a perceptual experience and how much resides in the emotional response to artwork? Paintings of landscapes are
likely to activate the parahippocampus, still lifes lateral occipital cortex, and portraits the fusiform gyrus. Does
beauty modify these activations further? Perhaps these responses simply reflect category-specific activations evoked
by perception itself and the aesthetic work is done within
reward systems. However, many feel that we perceive
beautiful objects more vividly than nonbeautiful objects.
Some studies show neural responses to beauty within ventral occipito-temporal cortex. Does ventral visual cortex
contain general “visual beauty detectors”? Because people
are inclined to look longer at beautiful things, are such
Chatterjee
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ventral visual activations a consequence of attention or is
there an independent aesthetic factor that modulates
neural activity? The relationship of attention and aesthetic
perception remains to be sorted out.
Fairhall and Ishai (2008), Wiesmann and Ishai (2008),
and Yago and Ishai (2006) have used paintings as stimuli
to study object recognition and recall. In these studies, they
find activations in limbic and prefrontal regions, suggesting
that emotional and reward systems are activated automatically even though participants are not making evaluations.
The apparent automaticity of our response to beauty or to
art is an area that invites further investigation.
One could also investigate the relationship of perception to aesthetics in brain-damaged people. Some people
with brain damage probably do not perceive art in the
same way that non-brain-damaged individuals do, and
their emotional responses to artwork may very well differ
from those of people without brain damage. Such neuropsychological investigations of aesthetic perception to date
are nonexistent.
The Nature of Aesthetic Judgment
Recent cognitive neuroscience methods probe individual
differences. As these methods continue to develop, they
could also be used to examine individual differences
in aesthetic sensitivities. Aesthetic sensitivity has been referred to as a “T-factor”, for taste (Eysenck & Hawker,
1994; Eysenck, 1941). People can also develop taste with
training. Behavioral studies show differences in the way
that art-experienced individuals and art-naïve individuals
engage with works of art (Locher, Stappers, & Overbeeke,
1999; Hekkert & Van Wieringen, 1996). Understanding the
neural basis for taste and the ways aesthetic judgment
might be modified with training would be of great interest.
The studies conducted thus far suggest that parts of
dorsolateral and medial prefrontal cortex are involved in
making aesthetic judgments. These studies do not sort out
whether these brain activations are specific to aesthetic
judgments or are part of neural systems that make judgments regardless of the domain under consideration. We
do not know if aesthetic judgments engage neural circuits
that are not engaged in other judgments.
Another issue around aesthetic judgments is the institutional context in which art is usually viewed. For example,
Leder et al. (2004) argued that the same object is apprehended and evaluated differently when viewed “as artwork.” Recently, Cupchik, Vartanian, Crawley, and Mikulis
(2009) showed differences in brain activations when participants looked at art paintings in an “objective and
detached” manner than in a “subjective and engaged”
manner with an emphasis on experiencing the mood
evoked by the paintings. They found greater activity in left
lateral prefrontal cortex in the latter condition, which they
regard as aesthetic, than when participants looked at paintings in a detached manner. Although the cognitive mechanism underlying this difference in activation patterns is
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not clear from the experiment, it demonstrates that the
same object, when viewed under different conditions,
can evoke different neural responses.
Characterizing the Aesthetic “Reward”
Beauty is a critically important aspect of how most people think of aesthetics ( Jacobsen et al., 2004). However,
aesthetics is not confined to beauty. Some artwork is specifically designed to be provocative and disturbing. Ultimately, a comprehensive program in neuroaesthetics
would incorporate motivations in the creation of and the
response to art that engage emotional systems beyond
pleasurable reward systems.
With respect to pleasure evoked by beauty or art, the
imaging studies reviewed here implicate orbito-frontal
cortex, the anterior and posterior cingulate, the ventral
striatum including the nucleus accumbens, the caudate,
and the amygdala as mediating the emotional response to
beauty or to artwork. Presumably, these structures differ in
their functions. We need a better sense of how the orchestration of activity within these structures contributes to an
overall emotional aesthetic (Biederman & Vessel, 2006).
Evolutionary arguments for the importance of beauty often emphasize its importance in mate selection. Mate selection is a utilitarian goal and the argument is that the
features that signal a desirable mate are the features we regard as beautiful. This utilitarian goal is at odds with an idea
proposed in the 18th century (Kant, 1790/1987) that the
aesthetic attitude is one of “disinterested interest.” On this
view, aesthetic objects give pleasure without evoking additional desires. Stated differently, what distinguishes the
neural response to an aesthetic experience from other rewarding experiences? Could neuroscience contribute to
an understanding of disinterested interest?
Berridge and Kringelbach (2008) and Wyvell and Berridge
(2000) draw a distinction between “liking” and “wanting”.
Liking seems to be mediated by the nucleus accumbens
shell and the ventral pallidum mediated by opioid and
GABAerigic neurotransmitter systems. By contrast, the
mesolimbic dopaminergic system, which includes the nucleus accumbens core, might mediate wanting. Cortical
structures, such as the cingulate and orbito-frontal cortex,
may contribute further to conscious modulations of these
liking and wanting experiences. This liking/wanting distinction is made in a rodent model with experiments
using sweet and bitter tasting stimuli. Whether the liking/
wanting distinction generalizes to humans or to visual stimuli remains to be seen. However, one might test the hypothesis that a self-contained reward system exists and
forms the basis for aesthetic disinterested interest.

CHALLENGES
These are early days in the neuroscience of visual aesthetics. With a field so young, development in any direction
would be an advance. However, I suggest that practitioners
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of neuroaesthetics might keep the following challenges in
mind: risks of reduction, distinguishing investigations probing the brain from those probing aesthetics, and adding
value to our understanding of aesthetics using neuroscience.

Risks of Reduction
Experimental neuroaesthetics needs to conform to the constraints of any experimental science. That is, experiments
need to be motivated by general frameworks and to test falsifiable hypotheses. Such experimental work would analyze
specific components of the broader universe of
aesthetics to simplify the domain needs in a way that allows
experimental control. Cognitive neuroscience studies of language, emotion, and decision-making are models of this approach. Further, although qualitative analyses can certainly
provide important empirical information, quantification
more easily provides ways to test hypotheses rigorously.
The risk of decomposition and quantification is that reduction attenuates the very thing we are most interested in
studying. Take the example of the aesthetic responses to
beauty. Experimental aesthetics often addresses this issue
by obtaining preference ratings from participants. One
might ask methodological questions about whether
forced-choice approaches or Likert-scale ratings are a
more stable measure of peopleʼs preferences. One might
ask whether judgments of interestingness are the same as
judgments of preference. Or one might explore the relationship of complexity to either preference or to interest.
These are legitimate and important questions to be pursued. However, the pursuit of such questions might easily
obscure the basic question of how preference is related to
aesthetic experience. Is preference a diluted version of
the former? Or are deeply moving aesthetic experiences
qualitatively different than those assessed in the laboratory
with preference ratings? What do neuroscientists make of
notions such as “the sublime?” The sublime is an emotional experience mentioned frequently in aesthetics
(Kant, 1790/1987), but one that has, so far, had little traction in affective neuroscience. Reducing components of
aesthetics to quantifiable measures risks inviting the proverbial problem of looking for the dropped coin under the
lamp because that is where things are visible, even if the
coin was dropped elsewhere. This problem is true for experimental aesthetics in general, not just neuroaesthetics.

Distinguishing Investigations Probing the Brain
from Those Probing Aesthetics
Art can be used to probe properties of the brain. Because
brain systems devoted to aesthetics are complex and organized hierarchically, processing art potentially provides a
unique window into the interactions of various subsystems. For example, abstract paintings can be used as a
probe to investigate how the brain deals with indeterminate visual stimuli and tries to make sense of its visual

world (Fairhall & Ishai, 2008; Wiesmann & Ishai, 2008;
Yago & Ishai, 2006). This line of work can be distinguished
from those studies that use neuroscience to test hypotheses about the nature of aesthetics.
Fechner (1860), a century and a half ago, made the distinction between an outer psychophysics and an inner
psychophysics. Outer psychophysics is the study of the relationship between psychology and the physical properties of stimuli. This kind of study has been the thrust of
empirical aesthetics ever since. Inner psychophysics is
the study of the relationship between psychology and
the physical (or physiological) properties of the brain.
Fechner recognized that an inner psychophysics might
be possible eventually. Neuroscience technologies such
as fMRI, ERPs, and transcranial magnetic stimulation now
provide the means of pursuing an inner psychophysics.
The nature of the triangular relationships among psychology, outer physics, and inner physics could be made
explicit. Conducting research that probes the relationship
between outer and inner physics without direct recourse
to psychology is possible. Here properties of objects, possibly aesthetic objects, would be/are used to probe the
properties of the brain. In such experiments, finely characterized stimuli are related to the spatial and temporal response properties of neurons. Thus, one might find that
the lateral occipital complex responds parametrically to
some physical properties of objects, important information in its own right. The unanswered psychophysical
question would be, do lateral occipital complex neurons
simply serve a classification function, distinguishing between objects and other visual stimuli like faces and
places, or do they also serve an evaluative function, being
tuned to whether the configuration of objects are appealing as in the rich tradition of still life paintings? To answer
this question, researchers would use the brain to probe
the psychology of aesthetics rather than using aesthetic
objects to probe properties of the brain.
A danger in experiments designed to examine the relationship between inner and outer physics is that of making
inferences about the underlying psychology without adequate investigation of the relevant behavior. This general
problem is recognized in cognitive neuroscience as the reverse inference problem (Poldrack, 2006), where one uses
the location of neural activation to infer the underlying psychological process. Such an inference is valid as a conclusion if this area is engaged in only one psychological
process. Unfortunately, such one-to-one correspondences
between neural activation and psychological process are
rare in the brain. Findings of localized activations to specific
stimuli more often generate hypotheses about the mental
processes involved, rather than confirm these hypotheses.
Adding Value to Our Understanding
of Aesthetics Using Neuroscience
This issue, in my view, is the most important challenge for
neuroaesthetics. If the goal is to understand aesthetics (as
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opposed to understanding the brain), what does neuroaesthetics offer? When does neuroscience provide deeper
descriptive texture to our knowledge of aesthetics and
when does it deliver added explanatory force? Knowing
that the pleasure of viewing a beautiful painting is correlated with activity within orbito-frontal cortex or the nucleus
accumbens adds biologic texture to our understanding of
the rewards of aesthetic experiences. However, it is not obvious that it, by itself, advances our understanding of the
psychological nature of that reward.
For neuroscience to make important contributions to
aesthetics, the possibility of an inner psychophysics has
to be taken seriously. That is, how do the physiological
properties of the brain and the psychology of aesthetics
relate to each other? More specifically, when does neuroscience add something to the understanding of the psychology of aesthetics that cannot be discovered by
behavioral studies alone?
These are early days in neuroaesthetics. The challenges
mentioned here should not be construed as causes for
pessimism. These challenges apply equally to the cognitive
neuroscience of any complex domain. However, as neuroaesthetics comes of age, the field can be guided by the
lessons learned from investigations in more mature domains, such as the cognitive neuroscience of memory, language, and emotions.
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